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Abstract 
There are several well-known justifications 
for conditioning as the appropriate method 
for updating a single probability measure, 
given an observation. However, there is a 
significant body of work arguing for sets of 
probability measures, rather than single mea­
sures, as a more realistic model of uncer­
tainty. Conditioning still makes sense in this 
context-we can simply condition each mea­
sure in the set individually, then combine the 
results-and, indeed, it seems to be the pre� 
ferred updating procedure in the literature. 
But how justified is conditioning in this richer 
setting? Here we show, by considering an 
axiomatic account of conditioning given by 
van Fraassen, that the single-measure and 
sets-of-measures cases are very different. We 
show that van Fraassen's axiomatization for 
the former case is nowhere near sufficient for 
updating sets of measures. We give a con­
siderably longer (and not as compelling) list 
of axioms that together force conditioning in 
this setting, and describe other update meth­
ods that are allowed once any of these axioms 
is dropped. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A common criticism of the use of probability theory 
is that it requires the agent to make unrealistically 
precise uncertainty distinctions. One widely-used ap­
proach to dealing with this has been to consider sets of 
probability measures as a way of modeling uncertainty 
(see, for example, [Breese and Fertig 1991; Gilbo� 
and Schmeidler 1993; Huber 1980; Kyburg 1974; Levr 
1980; Smith 1961]). Given that one adopts the sets­
of-measures model, how should one update these mea­
sures in the light of new evidence? There is an "ob-
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vious" approach available, which is to apply standard 
probabilistic conditioning to each of the measures in 
the set individually and then combine the results. It is 
typically taken for granted that this is the appropriate 
thing to do (see, for example, [Cozman 1997]). But 
what justifies this approach? 
There have been numerous attempts to justify condi­
tioning as the appropriate way to update single prob­
ability measures. The standard approach involves 
Dutch Book arguments [Kemeny 1955; Shimony 1955; 
Teller 1973]. However, these arguments have not al­
ways been viewed as so convincing; see Bacchus, Ky­
burg, and Thaler [1990] and Howson and Urbach [1989] 
for a summary of these arguments and some counter­
arguments against them. In any case, even if we accept 
the standard justifications for conditioning, there is no 
a priori reason to believe that they must also apply to 
the sets-of-measures case. In fact, they may not, and 
demonstrating this is a major point of this paper. We 
focus here on a different, yet simple and compelling de­
fense of (ordinary) conditioning, due to van Fraassen 
[van Fraassen 1987; Hughes and van Fraassen 1985]. 
Van Fraassen considers two simple and arguably quite 
reasonable properties that we might demand of an up­
date process and shows that conditioning is the only 
mechanism that satisfies these properties. We show 
that these properties are not sufficient in the sets­
of-measures case. Indeed, there are numerous other 
update mechanisms that satisfy them. We also show 
that, by postulating enough extra properties, we can 
recover conditioning as the unique solution; however, 
the properties we seem to need are far less compelling 
than those required for the original result. 
We begin with an informal description of van 
Fraassen's result. He wants to examine arbitrary ap­
proaches for updating probabilities in the light of new 
evidence. Thus, he considers a function upd (for up­
date) that takes two arguments-a probability mea­
sure Pr on a domain W and a subset B � W-and 
returns a new probability measure upd(Pr, B), which, 
intuitively, is the result of updating Pr by the evidence 
B. It certainly seems reasonable to require 
if Pr' = upd(Pr,B), then Pr'(B) = 1. (1) 
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That is, after updating, we should ascribe probability 
1 to the evidence we have obtained. 
Another reasonable principle to require is what van 
Fraassen calls symmetry. We can also think of it as 
representation independence, in the sense of [Halpern 
and Koller 1995]. Intuitively, suppose we represent a 
situation using the worlds in W' rather than those in 
W. Let f transform W to W'; there is a correspond­
ing transformation f* of a probability Pr on W to 
a probability f*(Pr) on W'. Then we would expect 
upd to respect this transformation. Roughly speaking, 
this means that if Pr' = upd(Pr, B), then we would 
expect f*(Pr') = upd(f*(Pr), f(B)). More precisely, 
if B � W' and Pr' = upd(Pr, f- 1(B)), then we would 
expect f*(Pr') = upd(f*(Pr), B) . The formal defini­
tion is given in Section 3, but an example here might 
help explain the intuition. 
Example 1.1: Consider two agents who are reason­
ing about a given situation. One uses the primitive 
propositions p, q, and r; the second uses p and q. Let 
W consist of the eight truth assignments to p, q, and 
r ,  and let W' consist of the four truth assignments 
top and q. We take the eight worlds in W to be of 
the form Wijk, i ,  j, k E {0, 1 }, where i ,  j, and k give 
the truth value of p, q, and r ,  respectively. Thus, for 
example, in w101, p and r are true while q is false. 
Similarly, we take the worlds in W' to have the form 
w�j. We now consider the obvious mapping f from W 
toW' that maps Wijk to w�j · Given a measure Pr on 
W, f induces a measure f*(Pr) on W' in the natu­
ral way, i.e., by taking f*(Pr)(w�j) = Pr( { Wijo, Wijd ). 
We want it to be the case that our updating rule re­
spects this transformation. In this case, that would 
mean that f*( upd(Pr, f-1(B))) = upd(f* (Pr), B) for 
each B � W'. Thus, for example, we would have 
f* ( upd(Pr, { Wijo, Wijl}) = upd(f* (Pr), {wij} ). I 
Van Fraassen showed that the only updating rule that 
is representation independent in this sense and satisfies 
(1) is conditioning. 
We can apply van Fraassen's approach to the sets-of­
measures case in a straightforward way. We again con­
sider update functions that take two arguments, but 
now the first argument is a set of probability mea­
sure rather than a single probability measure, and 
the output is also a set of probability measures. Van 
Fraassen's two postulates have obvious analogues in 
this setting (which we formalize in Section 3). How­
ever, as we show by example, they are no longer strong 
enough to characterize conditioning. 
One interesting update function that satisfies both 
conditions is what Voorbraak [1996] has called con­
straining. This updating function is defined as fol­
lows: given a set X of probability measures and an 
observation B, it returns all the measures in X that 
assign B probability 1. That is, the observation B is 
viewed as placing a constraint on the set of probability 
measure-namely, that B must be assigned probabil-
ity 1. We then return all the measures in the set that 
satisfy this new constraint. Voorbraak argues that 
constraining is actually more appropriate than con­
ditioning when it comes to capturing a probabilistic 
analogue of the notion of expansion in the AGM [Al­
chourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson 1985] theory of 
belief change (where expansion is how beliefs change 
when we get extra information that is consistent with 
previously-held beliefs). 
In Section 3, we provide seven postulates on update 
functions that suffice to guarantee that an update 
function on sets of measures acts like conditioning. Be­
sides van Fraassen's postulates, our postulates include 
a "homomorphism" postulate, which says that the re­
sult of updating a set X of measures is the union of 
the result of updating each element in X separately, 
and a compositionality postulate, which says that up­
dating by B and then by C is the same as updating 
by B n C (and hence also the same as updating by 
C and then by B). We also include a postulate that 
limits the amount by which the post-update probabil­
ity of an event can exceed the value it would obtain 
under conditioning. The intuition for this is that an 
extremely improbable event should not receive a post­
update probability that is "too large". The postulate 
that we use to capture this intuition is arguably too 
strong; it is an open problem to what extent it can be 
weakened. 
Although our postulates are quite strong, we show that 
no subset of them suffices to force conditioning. Inter­
estingly, if we drop our last postulate, then there are 
exactly two update functions that are consistent with 
the remaining six: conditioning and constraining. 
We believe we are the first to try to axiomatize the 
updating of sets of probability measures, but others 
have certainly examined the issue of updating other 
notions of uncertainty that are related to sets of prob­
ability measures. Besides the work of Voorbraak cited 
above, we briefly mention three other lines of research: 
• It is well known that a Dempster-Shafer be­
lief function Bel [Shafer 1976] can be associ­
ated with the set of probability measures that 
dominate it, that is, the set PBel = {Pr : 
Pr(A) 2:: Bel(A) for all A}. In fact, Bel(A) = 
infPrEPBel Pr(A). One way of defining the up­
date of Bel by a set B, considered in [Fagin and 
Halpern 1991; Jaffray 1992], is to take Bel(·IB) = 
infPrEPBel Pr(AIB). This approach to updating 
is quite different from Dempster's Rule of Con­
ditioning [Shafer 1976]. (See [Halpern and Fagin 
1992] for a discussion of the differences.) Moral 
and de Campos [1991] consider yet other ap­
proaches to updating belief functions. 
• Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993] consider update 
rules for non-additive probabilities (of which be­
lief functions are a special case, as are convex sets 
of probability measures). They show that under 
certain assumptions, the maximum-likelihood up-
date rule is equivalent to Dempster's Rule of Con­
ditioning. We discuss these results in more detail 
in Section 3. 
• Walley [1991] has a theory of lower and upper 
previsions based on gambles and considers an ap­
proach to updating previsions called the gener­
alized Bayes rule, which, as the name suggests, 
generalizes standard conditional probability. Sets 
of gambles can be associated with (convex) sets 
of probability measures; Moral and Wilson [1995] 
consider approaches to revising closed sets of gam­
bles given another gamble1 and relate their ap­
proaches to the AGM postulates. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec­
tion 2 we define update functions carefully and give 
some examples of them. In Section 3, we state our pos­
tulates. In Section 4 we outline the proof of our main 
result, which is that our postulates characterize con­
ditioning. Despite the strength of our postulates, our 
proof is surprisingly difficult, which is perhaps further 
evidence that quite strong postulates are necessary to 
characterize conditioning in the sets-of-measures case. 
We conclude in Section 5. 
2 UPDATE FUNCTIONS 
The general framework we work in is a straightforward 
extension of van Fraassen's. Suppose we have a mea­
sure space M = (W, F), that is, a domain W and an 
algebra F over W.2 Let 6M consist of all probability 
measures over M. An update function on M is a func­
tion Upd: 26-M x F �26-M , such that Upd(X, B) = 0 
if Pr(B) = 0 for all Pr E X. 3 That is, Upd takes as 
input a set of probability measures over M and an 
element ofF, and returns a set of measures over M. 
Intuitively, Upd(X, B) consists of the result of updat­
ing the measures in X by the observation B. If X 
is the singleton set {Pr}, we write Upd(Pr,B) rather 
than Upd({Pr},B). Note that for us, however, unlike 
for van Fraassen, Upd(Pr, B) is a set of measures (pos­
sibly empty), not a single measure. 
Van Fraassen's symmetry requirement (i.e., represen-
1 Since events can be viewed as a special case of gam­
bles, this is a more general notion of updating than that 
considered here. 
2 An algebra :F over W is a set of subsets of W that in­
cludes W and is closed under complementation and union, 
so that if A, B E X, then so are A and AU B. In the 
case that W is infinite, we could also require that :F be a 
u-algebra, that is, closed under countable union. None of 
our results would change if we made this requirement. 
3The final condition in this definition is analogous to 
the conventional restriction that one cannot condition on 
a measure 0 event. It is well known that the problem of 
defining a sensible notion of "update" for measure 0 events 
is a nontrivial one, even in the the conventional (single 
measure) framework. However, this problem is (largely) 
orthogonal to the topic of this paper. Note that this con­
dition implies that Upd(0, B) = 0. 
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tation independence), considers not one update func­
tion, but two, acting on different domains, and re­
lates their outputs. Thus, we are interested in families 
UpdM of update functions, one for each measure space 
M. We use Upd as a way of denoting the whole family 
{ Up�}.4 
As defined, families of update functions can be com­
pletely arbitrary. They can act like conditioning in 
one space and return a fixed probability measure in 
another. We now give examples of seven families of 
update functions that are not completely arbitrary, in 
that they satisfy a number of properties of interest to 
us, although in some cases their behavior is quite far 
from conditioning. 
• Upd;;;;nd(X,B) = {Pr(·IB) : PrE X,Pr(B) > 0}. 
Updcond is the standard update via conditioning. 
More precisely, we condition when possible; we 
simply discard those probability measures Pr E X 
such that Pr(B) = 0. 
• Upd;;;;nstrain(X,B) = {PrE X :  Pr(B) = 1}. 
Updconstrain is just Voorbraak's [1996] notion of 
constraining, as discussed in the Introduction. 
Note that Upd;;;;nstrain(X, B) = 0 if X contains 
no probability measures Pr such that Pr(B) = 1. 
• Updj,;rget(X,B) = {PrE 6M: Pr(B) = 1}. 
With Updf_o_Tfl.et> we ignore the information in X al­together. While this may seem to be a completely 
uninteresting update function, note that it can be 
viewed as modeling an agent who learns B, but 
then forgets what he knew before (which we can 
think of as being encoded by X). It points out the 
role of "no forgetting" in conditioning, an issue to 
which we return below. 
• Upd�vial(X, B)= 0. 
We have already seen that, in general, we may 
have Upd(X, B) = 0 even if X =f. 0. With 
Updtrivial> we take this one step further and have 
the output be the empty set independent of X 
and B. While this is clearly a rather uninterest­
ing update function, we must be careful about 
what requirements to impose to ban it, so we do 
not ban too much. 
• Upd�sure(X,B) = Upd;;;nd(X
c,B) = ({Pr(·IB): 
Pr E xc, Pr(B) =f. 0} ), where xc denotes the 
topological closure of X, that is, xc consists of 
all measures Pr such that for all f > 0, there ex­
ists a measure Pr' EX such that supAEF I Pr(A)­
Pr'(A)I < t:. 
Updclosure shows that update functions can take 
topological conditions into account. Note that 
Updcond and Updclosure agree on all finite sets X. 
4Readers concerned about cardinality considerations 
should think in terms of restricting to domains that have 
at most a certain cardinality, such as the cardinality of the 
reals. 
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The difference between them only arises if their 
first argument is infinite. For example, suppose 
M2 = ( {1, 2}, 2{1•2}) and X = {Pr E 6.M2 : 
Pr({2}) < 1}. Then Upd;,;�d(X, {1, 2}) = X, 
while Upd��ure(X, {1, 2}) = 6.M2 , since x
c = 
6.M2:  every probability measure in 6.M2 not in 
X must give {2} probability 1, and can be ap­
proximated arbitrarily closely by a measure in X. 
• Upd�bset(Pr, B) = 
{ 
{Pr(·IC 1\ B) : C � W, Pr(C 1\ B) > 0} 
if Pr(B) < 1 
{Pr} if Pr(B) = 1 
Upd�bset(X, B) = UPrEX Upd�bset(Pr, B). 
Intuitively, if Pr(B) < 1, then Upd�bset(Pr, B) 
amounts to conditioning on all events we could 
learn in addition to B. We treat the case that 
Pr(B) = 1 specially, to ensure that Updsubset sat­
isfies one of the postulates we consider. For ar­
bitrary sets X of probability measures, we apply 
Updsubset pointwise (and then take unions). Our 
interest in Updsubset is motivated by the fact that 
it satisfies many natural properties while being 
quite different from Updcond and Updconstrain· 
• Upii:n(X, B) = {Pr(·jB) : Pr E X, Pr(B) > 
0, Pr(B) = SUPPr'EX Pr (B)}. 
UpdML is the maximum likelihood rule considered 
by Gilboa and Schmeidler [1993] (except that they 
restrict to the case that X is a closed convex set, 
which guarantees that there is some Pr E X such 
that Pr(B) = SUPPr'EX Pr'(B)). It is an instance 
of what they call a classical update rule, which is 
one of the form UpdM(X, B) = {Pr(·IB) : Pr E 
X' � X}, for some appropriately chosen X'. Note 
that Updcond> Updconstrain> Updtrivial> and UpdML 
are all classical update rules in this sense. 
3 THE POS TULATES 
What properties should an update function have? We 
want to start by imposing the two properties consid­
ered by van Fraassen. The first is easy to formalize in 
our framework. 
Pl. UpdM(X, B) � {PrE 6.M: Pr(B) = 1} 
That is, if we learn B, we want to assign probability 1 
to B. Notice that all seven update functions described 
above satisfy this postulate. 
To define the second postulate (i.e., representation in­
dependence) carefully, we review some material from 
[Halpern and Koller 1995]. What does it mean to shift 
from a representation (i.e., a measure space) M = 
(W, F) to another representation M' = (W', F')? 
There are many ways of shifting from one represen­
tation to another. For us, it suffices to consider what 
is perhaps the simplest case, where each world in W' is 
associated with several worlds in W. We can think of 
representation W as being richer than representation 
W', in the sense of using additional primitive proposi­
tions or random variables to describe a world. This is 
the situation in Example 1.1, where in W we used three 
primitive propositions to describe a world, whereas in 
W' we used only two. We can then associate with each 
world in W' all the worlds in W that agree with it on 
all the primitive propositions it uses. Formally, this 
association is captured by a surjective map from W to 
W'. 
Definition 3 .1 :  A representation shift from M = 
(W,F) to M' = (W,F'), also called an M-M' rep­
resentation shift, is a measurable surjective map from 
W to W', that is, a surjection f : W --+ W' such 
that f-1 (B) E F for all B E F' (where, as usual, 
f-1(B) = {x E W: f(x) E B}). I 
As is well known, f-1 is a homomorphism with respect 
to unions and complementation, that is, f-1(BUB') = 
f-1(B) U f-1(B') and f-1(B) = j-1(B) (where we 
use U to denote the complement of U). The fact that 
f is surjective also makes f-1 1-1.5 An M-M' repre­
sentation shift also induces a map f* : 6.M --+ 6.M'; 
we define Cf*(Pr))(A) = Pr(f-1(A)) .6  Finally, if 
X� 6.M, then we define j*(X) = {f*(Pr) : PrE X}. 
With these definitions, we can formally state van 
Fraassen's representation independence property. In­
tuitively this says that, so long as we are updating by 
an event in F', it should not make any difference if 
we are fact working in a space M that is capable of 
making finer distinctions than does M'. Another con­
sequence is that the "labels" attached to points cannot 
affect how we update measures. 
P2. Let f be an M-M' representation shift. If 
X� 6.M and BE F', then UpdM' (f*(X), B) = 
f*( UpdM(X, f-1(B))) .  
As we said in the introduction (and will also follow 
from the results in Section 4), van Fraassen showed 
that if we consider update functions upd from proba­
bility measures to probability measures (rather than 
from sets of probability measures to sets of probabil­
ity measures) , then P1 and P2 (appropriately modified 
to deal with upd rather than Upd) suffice to guaran­
tee that upd is conditioning. However, it is easy to 
see that all seven of the update functions described in 
Section 2 satisfy both P1 and P2. 
Can we impose other reasonable properties that re­
strict the set of allowable update functions? One prop­
erty of conditioning is that order does not matter. Up­
dating by B and then C is the same as updating by 
C and then B, and both are the same as updating by 
B n C. This property does not follow from P1 and P2 
5In the language of [Halpern and Koller 1995], iff is an 
M-M' representation shift, then f-1 is a faithful M'-M 
embedding. 
6 f* is what van Fraassen calls a measure embedding. 
in our more general setting. Updforget provides a coun­
terexample: if we update by B and then by C using 
Updforget> we get all the probability measures that give 
C probability 1; if we update by C and then B, then 
we get all the probability measures that give B prob­
ability 1; if we update by B n C, we get all probability 
measures that give B n C probability 1. Thus, we add 
the requirement that updates commute to our list of 
properties as well. 
Although P3 is a standard property of conditioning, it 
is far from innocuous. It can be viewed as encoding an 
assumption of "no forgetting" . Intuitively, in order for 
updating by B and then C to be the same as updating 
by B n C, the agent must remember the information 
in B when he is updating by C. 
It is easy to see that P3 is not satisfied by either 
Updforget or UpdML' although it is satisfied by the other update rules defined in Section 2. As observed 
in [Fagin and Halpern 1991; Jaffray 1992], the up­
date rule for belief functions define by Bel(·IB) = 
infPrEPBet Pr(AIB) also does not satisfy P3.7 On the 
other hand, Dempster's Rule of Conditioning does sat­
isfy P3. Gilboa and Schmeidler [1993] provide suffi­
cient conditions on X that guarantee that UpdML sat­
isfies P3.8 Moreover, they show UpdML(X, B) acts like 
Dempster's Rule of Conditioning for those sets X that 
satisfy these conditions. 
We clearly need further postulates to rule out functions 
besides UpdML and Updfor'J.et· The next postulate says our beliefs don't change it we learn information that 
we expected to be true all along (i.e., which was given 
probability 1 by all measures in our current set). This 
suffices to rule out Updtrivial· 
P4. UpdM(X, B) = X  if Pr(B) = 1 for all PrE X. 
It is easy to see that P4 is satisfied by Updsubset as 
well as Updcond and Updconstrain· (Note that the spe­
cial treatment of Updsubset(Pr, B) in the case that 
Pr(B) = 1 was necessary to ensure this.) Although 
P4 is not satisfied by Updclosure> we could modify 
Updclosure(X, B) in the special case that Pr(B) = 1 
for all Pr E X so that it does satisfy P4. We thus need 
a stronger condition to rule out update functions such 
as Updclosure· The next postulate, which says that the 
action of an update function on a set of measures is 
determined by its action on the individual members of 
the set, does that. 
7 J affray [1992, Corollary 2) characterizes the restricted 
circumstances when P3 holds for this update rule. 
8Suppose that X consist of a set of probability measures 
on M = (W,F). Let fx(A) = min{Pr(A) :PrE X} for 
A E :F. The Gilboa-Schmeidler conditions say that (1) X 
is convex, (2) X= {PrE b.M : Pr(A);::: fx(A)}, and (3) 
fx(AUB)+ fx (An B);::: fx(A)+ fx(B), for all A, BE :F. 
See [Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993) for the motivation for 
these conditions. 
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As we have seen, Updclosure does not satisfy P5; it acts 
like Updcond on finite sets, but disagrees with Updcond 
in general on arbitrary sets. UpdML does not satisfy P5 
either. It might seem that once we force the behavior 
of an update function to depend only on its behavior 
of singletons, we should be able to appeal immediately 
to van Fraassen's result. This, however, is not true, 
because UpdM(Pr, B) can still be an arbitrary set of 
probability measures. All of the update functions in 
our examples other than Updclosure and UpdML satisfy 
P1, P2, and P5. 
It might seem that P5 gives too special a role to the 
action of Upd on singleton sets. This is not in keeping 
with the spirit modeling uncertainty by arbitrary sets 
of probability measures. We can rewrite P5 to avoid 
mention of singleton sets by requiring instead that Upd 
commute with arbitrary unions, that is, 
UpdM(UjEJXj, B) = UjEJ UpdM(Xj, B), 
where J is an arbitrary index set. It is easy to see 
that this postulate is equivalent to P 5 while not giv­
ing a special role to singleton sets. We wrote P5 as we 
did because in fact we need it only for singleton sets. 
Note that it is important to allow the index set J to 
be arbitrary here. The perhaps more appealing pos­
tulate UpdM (X U Y, B) = UpdM (X, B) U UpdM (Y, B) 
(which can be extended by induction to show that Upd 
commutes with finite unions) is not strong enough to 
eliminate Updclosure· 
All of the properties we have considered so far are sat­
isfied by Updsubset· We consider here two ways of elim­
inating Updsubset· Neither is as clean as we would like. 
After introducing the postulates, we discuss possible 
alternatives. 
One way of eliminating Updsubset is to require that on 
a singleton argument, Upd returns either a singleton 
or the empty set.9 More precisely, we have 
P6'. l UpdM(Pr, B)lS1. 
P6' again puts more emphasis on singleton sets than 
we would like, and seems somewhat strong. A quite 
different approach to eliminating Updsubset is based 
on the observation that it is not "continuous" : ev­
ery event in B that has nonzero probability according 
to Pr (including ones whose probability is negligible) 
will be given full belief (probability 1) in at least one 
of the post-update measures, while the rest of B (per­
haps containing almost all of B's probability accord­
ing to Pr) is given probability 0. Perhaps there should 
be some limit on how much the probability of a small 
event can increase. The next postulate ensures this, by 
requiring an upper bound on the post-update proba­
bility relative to the original conditional probability. 
9We must allow it to return an empty set since 
UpdM (Pr, B) is required to be 0 if Pr(B) = 0. 
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P6". For all M = (W, F) and Pr E �M, there exists a 
constant c such that for all A, B E F and Pr' E 
UpdM(Pr,B), we have Pr'(A):::; cPr(AIB). 
Clearly P6" suffices to eliminate Updsubset· However, 
it does not seem as natural as our other assumptions. 
Even if we accept the need for a continuity postulate, 
there seem to be weaker and more natural formaliza­
tions of it. In fact, the following postulate seems to 
assert continuity more directly: 
P6*. For all M = (W,F) , Pr E �M, B E F, and 
€ > 0, there exists 8 > 0 such that if A E F and 
Pr(AIB) < 8, then Pr'(A) < € for every Pr' E 
UpdM (Pr, B). 
P6* also suffices to rule out Updsubset· However, we 
have not been able to prove that P1-P5 and P6* force 
Updcond and Updconstrain· Replacing P6* by P6' or P6" 
does the trick though. Let P6 state that either P6' or 
P6" holds. 
P6. Either P6' holds for all measures spaces M or P6" 
holds for all measure spaces M. 
The main result of this paper, proved in the next sec­
tion, is that Updcond and Updconstrain are the only up­
dating functions that satisfy P1-P6. 
What is the relationship between P6', P6", and P6*? 
It is easy to see that P6" implies P6*: given B, €, 
and c as in P6", we can take 8 < € Pr( B)/ c. As we 
show in the appendix, P6' together with P1 and P2 
implies both P6* and P6". Finally, it follows from 
the main result of this paper that P6" together with 
P1-P5 implies P6' and P6*. 
Once we are down to Updcond and Updconstrain> it is 
easy to add another postulate to get just Updconstrain· 
The following weak postulate suffices: 
P7. There exists some measure space M = (W, F) , 
some set X � �M, and some set B E F such that 
Pr(B) # 1 for all PrE X and UpdM(X, B) # 0. 
It should be clear that Updcond satisfies P7, while 
Updconstrain does not. 
4 THE MAIN THEOREM 
The main result of the paper is the following. 
Theorem 4.1: The only update functions that satisfy 
P1-P6 are Updcond and Updconstrain· 
The following corollary is then immediate: 
Corollary 4.2: The only update function that satisfies 
P1-P7 is Updcond· 
In this section, we give a high-level outline of the proof 
of Theorem 4.1. Further details of the proof are de­
ferred to the appendix. We omit the proof of some 
of the more technical and difficult lemmas because of 
limited space. 
It is worth beginning with the following lemma, of 
which van Fraassen's result is a corollary. Roughly 
speaking, it says that the post-update probability we 
give to an event cannot be consistently smaller than 
its conditional probability. 
Proposition 4.3: Suppose that Upd satisfies P1 and 
P2 and that for some Pr' E UpdM(Pr, B) and A such 
that 0 < Pr(AIB) < 1, we have Pr'(A) < Pr(AIB). 
Then there also exists some Pr" E UpdM (Pr, B) such 
that Pr"(A) > Pr(AIB) . 
Proof: See the appendix. I 
Van Fraassen's result follows almost immediately from 
Proposition 4.3, as the following result shows. 
Proposition 4.4: If Upd satisfies P 1 and P2, and 
UpdM(Pr, B)= {Pr'}, then Pr' = Pr(- I B). 
Proof: Suppose UpdM(Pr, B)= {Pr'} and Pr'(A) # 
Pr(AIB) for 0 < Pr(AIB) < 1. Then either Pr'(A) < 
Pr(AIB) or Pr'(B- A) < Pr(B -AlB). But this 
contradicts Proposition 4.3, because there is no cor­
responding Pr". A separate, but simple, argument is 
needed when Pr(AIB) E {0, 1}. If Pr(AIB) = 1, con­
sider any disjoint A1, A2 such that A = A1 U A2 and 
0 < Pr(A1IB) < 1. (We can assume that such A1, A2 
exist, appealing to P2 if necessary.) But then 
Pr'(A) = Pr'(Al) + Pr'(A2) 
= Pr(A1I B) + Pr(A2IB) 
= Pr(AIB), 
where we use the fact that 0 < Pr(A1IB),Pr(A2IB) < 
1 and the previous argument. Finally, the case of 
Pr(AIB) = 0 follows by considering B - A. Thus 
Pr' = Pr(-IB). I 
It follows from Proposition 4.4 that P6' implies both 
P6" and P6* in the presence of P1 and P2. 
The next step towards our result is to characterize 
Updconstrain • 
Proposition 4.5: Suppose that Upd satisfies P1-P5 
and that UpdM (Pr, B) = 0 for some space M and 
some B with Pr(B) # 0. Then Upd = Updconstrain· 
Proof: See the appendix. I 
Note that by P4, we cannot have Pr(B) = 1 for the 
set B in Proposition 4.5. Thus, Proposition 4.5 tells us 
that if Upd satisfies P1-P6 (in fact, even if it satisfies 
just P1-P5) and does not satisfy P7, then it must be 
Updconstrain· It remains to show that if Upd satisfies 
P7 as well as P1-P6, then it must be Updcond· 
In the case that Upd satisfies P1-P5, P6', and P7, 
it follows from Proposition 4.5 that we must have 
I UpdM (Pr, B)l = 1 if Pr(B) f. 0. The fact that 
Upd = Updcond now follows immediately from Propo­
sition 4.4. Thus, it remains to show that if if Upd 
satisfies P1-P5, P6", and P7, then Upd = Updcond· 
To show this, we first prove an easy lemma, which 
shows that Upd must agree with conditioning at least 
on events with extreme probabilities. 
Lemma 4.6: If Upd satisfies P1, P3, and P4, Pr E 
D.M, A� B, and Pr(AIB) = 1 (resp., Pr(AIB) = 0), 
then for all Pr' E UpdM (Pr, B), we have Pr' (A) = 1 
(resp. , Pr'(A) = 0). 
Proof: Let M = (W, F). It suffices to prove the result 
for Pr(AIB) = 1, because the other case follows by 
considering B - A. 
Let C = W- (B - A). Since Pr(AIB) = 1, we have 
Pr( C) = 1. By P4, we have {Pr} = UpdM (Pr, C), 
and thus UpdM (Pr, B) = UpdM ( UpdM (Pr, C), B). 
By P3, UpdM( UpdM(Pr,C),B) = UpdM(Pr,B n 
C) = UpdM(Pr, A). It follows that UpdM(Pr, B) = 
UpdM(Pr,A). But by P1, if Pr' E UpdM(Pr, A), then 
Pr'(A) = 1. The result follows. I 
We now introduce a key concept. Given Upd, a mea­
sure space M = (W, F), a measure Pr E D.M, and 
events A C B E F such that 0 < Pr(A) :::; Pr(B) 
define 
p '(A) uUpd,M,Pr(A B) = sup --,--r__,;----.:....,--,-, 
Pr'EUpdM(Pr,B) Pr(A)/Pr(B) 
· 
(We take U Upd,M,Pr(A, B) = -oo if UpdM(Pr,B) = 0.) 
The intuition is that U Upd,M,Pr(A, B) should be 
viewed as a measure of how far Upd is from Updcond· It 
is the sup, over all the measures in UpdM (Pr, B), of the 
ratio of the (post-update) probability of A to Pr(AIB). 
Of course, if Upd = Updcond> then u
Upd,M,Pr(A, B) = 
1 for all A, B. As the following result shows, the con­
verse holds as well. 
Proposition 4. 7 : 
U Upd,M,Pr(A, B) 
Upd = Updcond· 
If Upd satisfies P1-P4 and 
1 for all M, A, and B, then 
Proof: Suppose that Upd f. Updcond· Then there 
exists a measure space M = (W, F), Pr E D.M, 
B E F, A � B, and Pr' E UpdM(Pr,B) such that 
Pr'(A) f. Pr(AIB). By Lemma 4.6 we know that 
PrJ AlB) is neither 0 nor 1. If Pr' (A) > Pr(AIB), then 
U pd,M,Pr(A, B) > 1, contradicting our assumption. 
But otherwise, we have Pr'(A) < Pr(AIB) and so, by 
Proposition 4.3, there exists Pr" E UpdM (Pr, B) such 
that Pr" (A) > Pr(AIB). Again, this contradicts our 
assumption. I 
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In light of Proposition 4.7, we can complete the proof 
of Theorem 4.1 by proving the following result: 
Proposition 4.8: If Upd satisfies P1-P5, P6'', and 
P7, then U Upd,M,Pr(A, B) = 1 for all M, A, B. 
Despite the strength of P6", the proof of Proposi­
tion 4.8 turns out to be surprisingly difficult. (More 
accurately, we have not been able to find a proof that 
is not difficult!) The details are in the appendix. 
5 DISCUSSION 
The main purpose of this paper is to illustrate how 
different the set-of-measures model can be, technically, 
from the standard single-measure model. In general, 
it is unwise to simply assume that a result in the stan­
dard model can be trivially "lifted" to apply in general. 
In terms of understanding update procedures, one ob­
vious next step would be to examine some of the other 
justifications for conditioning in the single-measure 
model, to see to what extent they carry over to the new 
setting. There are also outstanding questions even in 
the axiomatic framework considered here. P6, in par­
ticular, is quite a strong assumption. Is it really nec­
essary? We conjecture that our main result actually 
holds with P6 replaced by P6*, although we have not 
been able to prove this. (Recall that P6' implies both 
P6" and P6* in the presence of P1 and P2.) 
We are clearly not advocating P6 (or even P6*) as be­
ing anywhere near as compelling as, say, P1 or P2. (Of 
course, one can raise reasonable arguments against P1 
and P2-and most of the other postulates-as well.) 
So what does this say about Updcand and Updcanstrain? 
It seems quite plausible to us that other update pro­
cedures, such as UpdML• that will be appropriate in 
some circumstances. We believe that a more careful 
investigation into such alternative rules, and a contin­
ued effort to try and clearly determine what makes an 
update rule appropriate to a given domain, would be 
worthwhile. 
A APPENDIX: PROOFS 
For the proofs, it is useful to define the family of spaces 
Mn = ( {1, . . .  , n }, 2{l, ... ,n}). 
Proposition 4.3: Suppose that Upd satisfies P1 and 
P2 and that for some Pr' E UpdM (Pr, B) and A such 
that 0 < Pr(AIB) < 1, we have Pr'(A) < Pr(AIB) . 
Then there also exists some Pr" E UpdM (Pr, B) such 
that Pr"(A) > Pr(AIB) . 
Proof: Consider M = (W, F) and assume that B f. 
W. (The argument if B = W is almost identical and 
left to the reader.) By P2, it suffices to prove the result 
in the case that M = M3. (For any other M, we can 
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consider the surjection that maps A to 1, B- A to 2, 
and W - B to 3 and then appeal to P2.) 
There are now two cases to consider. First, assume 
that Pr(AIB) < 1 is rational, say mjn. Now consider 
the space Mn+l· Let A =  {1, . . . ,m}, B = {1, . . .  ,n}, 
and Pr give each of 1, ... , n equal probability. We can 
consider the surjection g : Wn+l -+ W3 that maps 
1, . . . ,m to 1, m +  1, ... ,n to 2, and n +  1 to 3. Thus, 
by P2 again, the result is true for M3 if we can show 
that it is true for an arbitrary measure Pr on Mn+I 
and Pr' E UpdMn+l (Pr, B). Note that the reason we 
have to introduce both M3 and Mn+l is that there 
is always a mapping from any other M for which the 
proposition is relevant into the former space, but not 
necessarily into the latter. 
Clearly Pr' does not give equal probability to each 
of the points 1, .. .  , n (for if it did, we would have 
Pr'(A) = mjn). In fact, the average probability of 
a point in A (according to Pr') is 1/n- t:jm, where 
E = Pr(AIB) - Pr'(A). There are two cases to con­
sider: If Pr(AIB) � 1/2, then n - m ::; m. In this 
case, let C consist of the n- m elements of A with the 
lowest probability (according to Pr') . We must have 
Pr'(C) ::; (n- m)jn- (n- m)t:jm. Let h be a permu­
tation on {1, . . . , n + 1} that switches the points in C 
with the points in B- A such that h(n + 1) = n + 1. 
Note that h*(Pr) = Pr (since Pr gives equal prob­
ability to all the points in B). Let Pr" = h*(Pr') . 
Note that Pr"(B- A) ::; (n- m)jn- ((n- m)jn)t:, 
so Pr"(A) � mjn + ((n- m)jn)t:. If Pr(AIB) < l/2, 
then n - m > m, and a similar argument works: This 
time, let C consist of the m elements of A with the 
lowest probability. In this case we get that Pr"(A) � 
mjn + (mjn)t:. Since h*(Pr') E UpdM(Pr,B) by P2, 
we are done. Note that, in either case, Pr" (A) � 
Pr(AIB) + min(Pr(AIB), 1- Pr(AIB)) t:. 
Next suppose that Pr(AIB) is irrational. Choose r ra­
tional such that Pr(AIB) > r > Pr(AIB) - min(r, 1-
r)t:/2. By using P2 again, it suffices to prove the 
result for M4, with A = {1, 2}, B = {1, 2, 3}, and 
Pr({1}IB) = r. Let A' = {1}. Since Pr'(A') :::; 
Pr'(A) = Pr(AIB)-t:, it follows that Pr'(A') < r-t:/2. 
Since Pr(A'IB) is rational by construction, by the pre-
vious argument, there exists Pr" E UpdM (Pr, B) such 
that Pr"(A') � r + min(r, 1- r)t:/2 > Pr(AIB). Since 
A'� A, we have Pr"(A) > Pr(AIB), as desired. I 
Proposition 4.5: Suppose that Upd satisfies P1-
P5 and that UpdM(Pr,B) = 0 for some space M and 
Pr(B) # 0. Then Upd = Updconstrain· 
We prove this using Lemmas A.1-A.3. 
Lemma A.l: If Upd satisfies P2, UpdM(Pr,B) = 0, 
and Pr(B) = a < l, then for every space M', prob­
ability measure Pr' E AM', qnd B' E F' such that 
Pr'(B') = a, we have UpdM' (Pr',B') = 0 .  
Proof: First assume that M' = M2 B' = {2}. Then 
the result is immediate using P2. (Consider the M­
M' representation shift that maps B to {2} and B to 
{1}.) Now if M' is arbitrary, we again get the result 
by applying P2 and using the fact that it holds for M2. 
(Again, consider the M'-M2 representation shift that 
maps B' to {2} and B to {1}.) I 
We can bootstrap our way up to an even stronger 
lemma. 
Lemma A.2 : If Upd satisfies P2 and P3, and 
UpdM(Pr,B) = 0 for some B with Pr(B) = a  < 1, 
then for every domain M', probability measure Pr' E 
AM', and B' � W' such that Pr' (B') < a, we have 
UpdM' (Pr', B') = 0. 
Proof: First consider the space M3 and let Pr" 
be a measure such that Pr" ( {2, 3}) = a and 
Pr"({3}) = {3 < a. By Lemma A.1, we have that 
UpdM3 (Pr", {2, 3}) = 0. By P3, we have that 
UpdM3(Pr",{2}) = UpdM3(( UpdM3(Pr",{2,3}),{2})) 
= UpdM3(0, {2}) = 0. 
By Lemma A.1 again, it follows that for every space 
M' = (W', F'), probability measure Pr' E AM',  
and B' E F' such that Pr'(B') = {3, we have 
UpdM' (Pr', B') = 0. Since {3 was arbitrary, the de­
sired result follows. I 
Finally, we get the strongest possible result of this 
type. 
Lemma A.3: If Upd satisfies P1, P2, P3, and PS, 
UpdM (Pr, B) = 0, then UpdM' (Pr', B') = 0 for every 
domain M', probability measure Pr' E AM', and set 
B' such that Pr' ( B') < 1. 
Proof: Let "Y* = sup
M
,,s{Pr'(B') :  UpdM'(Pr',B) = 
0}. We want to show that "Y* = 1. Suppose by way 
of contradiction that "Y* < 1. Choose € > 0 such that 
0 < "Y* - E, "Y* + E < 1, and ("'!* - t:)/("Y* + t:) > "Y*. 
Consider the space M3 again and let Pr' be such that 
Pr'(2) = "Y*- € and Pr'(3) = 2t:. By choice of "Y* and 
Lemma A.2, we have that UpdM3 (Pr', {2}) = 0 and 
UpdM3 (Pr', {2, 3}) # 0. By P3, we have 
UpdM3(( UpdM3(Pr', {2, 3} ),  {2}) 
= UpdM3(Pr',{2}) = 0. 
(2) 
However, since UpdM3 (Pr', {2, 3}) # 0, by Proposi­
tion 4.3, there exists some Pr" E UpdM3 (Pr', {2, 3}) 
such that Pr"(2) � Pr'( {2}1{2, 3}) = ("'!* - t:)/b* + 
.:) > "Y*· By Lemma A.2 and the choice of 
"Y\ we have that UpdM3(Pr",{2}) # 0. By P5, 
UpdM3(Pr",{2}) � UpdM3(( UpdM3(Pr',{2,3}),{2}). 
This contradicts (2). Thus, we must have "Y* = 1. I 
It follows from Lemmas A.2 and A.3 
that UpdM (Pr, B) = 0 if Pr(B) < 1. Proposition 4.5 
now follows immediately from P4 and P5. I 
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.5. In order 
to prove Theorem 4.1, it remains only to prove Propo­
sition 4.8. We first need a few preliminary lemmas. 
The first shows that the value of u Upd,M,Pr(A, B) de­
pends only on Upd and the values Pr(A) and Pr(B), 
but otherwise does not depend on the details of M or 
the exact identity of A and B. 
Lemma A.4: If Upd satisfies P1-P5 and P7 there 
is a function V Upd(x,y) defined for 0 < X � y � 1 
such that U Upd,M,Pr(A,B) = VUpd(Pr(A),Pr(B)) for 
all A � B E F with Pr(A) > 0. 
Proof: For 0 < x < y < 1, let Prx,y E b..M3 be 
defined so that Prx,y(1) = x and Prx,y(2) = y - x (so 
that Prx,y({1,2}) = y). Finally, define 
V Upd(x , y) = 
{ 1 if y = 1 or x = y 
U Upd,Mz,Prx.v({1},{1,2}) if 0 < X <  y < 1. 
We must show that this definition has the required 
properties. Consider any M, A, B, Pr such that A � 
B. If Pr(A) < Pr(B) < 1, then it is immediate 
from P2 that U Upd,M,Pr(A, B) = VUpd(Pr(A), Pr(B)) .  
I f  Pr(A) = Pr(B), then Lemma 4.6 assures us  that 
if Pr' E UpdM (Pr, B) then Pr' (A) = 1 and hence 
U Upd,M,Pr(A, B) = 1. Thus, the result follows as long 
as UpdM (Pr, B) is nonempty. But this follows from 
Proposition 4.5 and P7. Finally, if Pr(B) = 1, the 
result is immediate from P4.10 I 
Lemma A.5: If Upd satisfies P1-P5 and P7, then for 
any fixed y, V Upd(x, y) is a non-increasing function of 
x such that V Upd(y, y) = 1. 
Proof: See the full paper. I 
We need one more, rather technical, lemma. Our over­
all goal is to show that UpdM (Pr, C) = {Pr( ·I C)}. 
But perhaps it is reasonable to first ask a weaker 
question: is it true that Pr(·IC) E UpdM(Pr, C)? 
While the following lemma does not quite show this, 
it proves something in a very similar spirit. In partic­
ular, the lemma implies that, for every event B C C, 
there is some measure PrE E UpdM(Pr, C) such that 
PrE(B) = Pr(BIC). Note, however, that PrE may de­
pend on B and so this does not prove that Pr(·IC) E 
UpdM (Pr, C). On the other hand, the lemma also does 
something more than just assert the existence of PrE. 
Consider another event A disjoint from B and any 
10We remark that the only place we use P3 in this proof 
is in the appeal to Lemma 4.6. With a little more effort, 
the result can be proved even without P3. 
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Pr' E UpdM(Pr, C). Of course, Pr'(A) does not neces­
sarily equal Pr(AIC). But the lemma shows that there 
is another measure Pr" E UpdM (Pr, C) that agrees 
with Pr' on A and "looks like conditiQning" outside A, 
at least with respect to B. More precisely, Pr" (B) is 
exactly the final probability of C- A (i.e., 1- Pr'(A)) 
times the prior probability Pr(BIC- A). Note that if 
A = 0 this reduces to the earlier claim (since we can 
then take PrE = Pr"). 
Lemma A.6: Suppose that Upd satisfies Pl, P2, PrJ'. 
For all A, B C C C W such that A and B are dis­
joint elements ofF, Pr E b..M, Pr(B) > 0, and 
Pr' E UpdM(Pr, C) , there exists Pr" E UpdM(Pr, C) 
such that Pr"(A) = Pr'(A) and Pr"(B) = (1 -
Pr'(A)) Pr(BIC- A). 
Proof: See the full paper. I 
This omitted proof is rather complex. Unlike the 
other results in this section, which involved only fi­
nite spaces, it makes crucial of an uncountable space. 
More precisely, our proof makes crucial use of P2 ap­
plied to representation shifts involving an uncountable 
space (the unit interval with Lebesgue measure). We 
conjecture that the result would actually be false if 
we restrict P2 to representation shifts involving only 
countable spaces. Of course, our main theorem might 
still be true even if we restrict P2 to countable spaces; 
it might have a different proof that does not rely on 
Lemma A.6. 
Another point worth noting is that Lemma A.6 can 
be proved using the weaker postulate P6* rather than 
P6". Unfortunately, this does not seem to be true for 
Proposition 4.8, which we are finally ready to prove. 
Proposition 4.8: If Upd satisfies P1-P5, PrJ', and 
P7, then uupd,M,Pr(A, B)= 1 for all M, A, B. 
Proof: By Lemma A.5, we see that vupd(x, y) is 
bounded below by 1 (and in fact the bound is attained 
when x = y). On the other hand, by P6", there is 
also a finite upper bound c. In fact, we can assume 
that c is the least upper bound. Suppose by way of 
contradiction that c > 1. 
The basic idea of the proof is to use P3 and show that 
there is a sequence of two iterated updates in which 
some event's probability grows by more than c (relative 
to what we would expect from conditioning). We also 
show (using P3) that there is a single update which 
would give the same result. However, this contradicts 
the definition of c. 
Consider c' = (c + vc)/2; note that c'2 > c but 1 < 
c' < c. In particular, by the definition of c and since 
c' < c we can find some x, z such that V Upd(x, z) > c'. 
Furthermore, by the monotonicity of V Upd, we also 
have V Upd( x', z) > c' for x' < x. In the following, con­
sider any x' < x such that ex'/ z � x. Now consider 
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the space M4. Let A= {1}, B = {1, 2}, C = {1, 2, 3}, 
and let Pr be a measure such that Pr(A) = x' and 
Pr(C) = z. This does not completely specify Pr; in 
particular, the only constraint so far on Pr(B) is that 
it lies between x' and z. Note, however, that the set 
{r : Pr'(A) = r for some Pr' E UpdM4(Pr, C)} is in­
dependent of the exact probability we give to B, be­
cause of postulate P2. In the following, choose some 
value r from this set such that r > c'x' lz; the defi­
nition of V Upd guarantees that such an r must exist, 
since vUpd(x', z) > c'. Note also that r < cx'lz by 
definition of c. Thus, r < x, by choice of x'. 
We now complete the specification of Pr by defining 
Pr(2) = (z- r)(z- x')l(1- r). It is easily verified 
that Pr( {1, 2}) is then between x' and z. Moreover, 
Pr( {2} I {2, 3}) is (z - r)l(1 - r) (since Pr( {2, 3) = 
Pr(C - A) = z - x'). Therefore, by Lemma A.6, 
there is some Pr' E UpdM4 (Pr, C) such that not only 
is Pr'(A) = r but furthermore 
Pr'(B) = Pr'(1)+Pr'(2) = r+(1-r)(z-r)l(1-r) = z. 
However, now consider UpdM4 (Pr', B). We know that 
Pr'(A) = r < ex' lz < x and Pr'(B) = z. Therefore 
(by the monotonicity ofVUpd) we have vupd(r, z) > c'. 
Thus, there must be some Pr" E UpdM4 (Pr', B) such 
that Pr" (A) > c'r I z > c'2x' I z2. 
By P3, we know that conditioning on C then B must 
give the same result as if we were to condition directly 
on B. Thus, UpdM4(Pr, B) must also contain Pr". 
It follows that VUpd(x', Pr(B)) 2 Pr"(A) Pr(B)Ix' 2 
c'2 Pr(B)I z2. Recall that c'2 > c. We thus will have 
a contradiction with the definition of c if we can show 
there exists x' such that Pr( B) I z2 is close enough to 1 
so that c'2 Pr(B)Iz2 exceeds c. But, in fact, we know 
that Pr(B) = x' + (z- r)(z- x')l(1- r). It is clear 
that by choosing x' (and hence also r) to be sufficiently 
small, we can make this as close to 1 as we wish. The 
result follows. I 
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